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Abstract
We develop the concept of institutional fragility to investigate the outward
foreign direct investment (OFDI) behavior of firms from emerging economies.
When different dimensions of institutions are not progressing at the same pace,
internal friction and conflict arise during institutional development. Such fragility
could push a firm to escape its home country as a strategic response. Using a
sample of 578,360 Chinese firm-year observations over a 10-year period, we find
that institutional fragility at the provincial level is associated with increased OFDI
decision. This relationship is weaker when firms have high productivity or have
been controlled by state with high ownership, stronger when firms have a high
level of export network. Overall, our institutional fragility perspective extends and
enriches the institution-based view and offers new insights into OFDI behavior.
Journal of International Business Studies (2017) 48, 452–476.
doi:10.1057/s41267-016-0050-z
Keywords: institution-based view; outward foreign direct investment; emerging
economies; market-based reform

INTRODUCTION
Escaping from a home country through outward foreign direct
investment (OFDI) is an increasingly important phenomenon that
is underdeveloped in both strategy and international business
literature (Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Luo &
Tung, 2007; Witt & Lewin, 2007; Yamakawa, Peng, & Deeds, 2008).
Existing literature, however, tends to predominantly focus on
firms’ OFDI as a response to institutional constraints in developed
economies (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Narula, 2002; Rugman &
Verbeke, 1998; Schoppa, 2006; Tallman, 1988). Our study shifts
this focus toward firms in emerging economies in which institutional constraints are different from those of developed economies.
We argue that prior studies along this line view institutions in the
developed economies as inertial forces—which increase the risk of
slowness in institutional adjustment (Witt & Lewin, 2007)—while
the development of institutions in emerging economies seems to
be more enabling since the way to develop these institutions is to
create a new institutional regime.
We argue that firms in emerging economies escape their
domestic institutional regimes in the form of OFDI because of
institutional fragility—defined as a situation in which different
institutional dimensions are not progressing at the same pace and
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thus creating internal friction and conflict during
development. The notion of institutional fragility is
consistent with the perspective that views institutional reform as dynamic (Kim, Kim, & Hoskisson,
2010; Banalieva, Eddleston, & Zellweger, 2015) and
multidimensional (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Sun, Shi,
& Chen, 2013; Marquis & Raynard, 2015) rather
than static (Aoki, 2001), discrete (Kim et al., 2010),
or as an aggregate or unidimensional construct. This
dynamic and multidimensional view recognizes the
fact that after decades of reforms, institutional
regimes in emerging economies are evolving over
time; however, the current focus is on how different
institutional dimensions can interact in a coherent
and consistent manner (Jackson & Deeg, 2008;
Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop, & Paunescu, 2010).
Such internal friction and conflict among different
institutional dimensions could raise both the cognitive and relational complexity that firms must
face in an environment (Boisot & Child, 1999; Child
& Rodrigues, 2011). We therefore ask the following
research questions: to what extent does institutional fragility associate with a firm’s key strategic
response, that is, to engage in OFDI or not? What
are the mechanisms underlying this relationship?
In addition, we argue that different firms exercise
different OFDI choices to respond to institutional
fragility. Building on Child and Rodrigues’s (2011)
three modes of firm engagement with external
complexity, we develop hypotheses on fragility
reduction, fragility penetration, and fragility mediation. We argue that firms with high productivity
could be well suited to reduce institutional fragility
by ‘‘imposing their own practices and rules’’ (Child
& Rodrigues, 2011: 811). State-owned enterprises
(SOEs) have strong resource-dependent relationships with home-country institutions (Cui & Jiang,
2012; Lu, Liu, Wright, & Filatotchev, 2014) and
thus multiple channels through which to interpret
and penetrate institutional fragility. Meanwhile,
existing local normative systems can help firms
learn from the behavior of others, which mediates
institutional fragility. In addition, firms with accumulated foreign experience could minimize the
impact of institutional fragility via their external
networks. Therefore such firm characteristics could
weaken or strengthen the mechanisms underlying
the relationship between institutional fragility and
OFDI. These factors all point to limitations of the
escape argument that prior studies have ignored
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016).

Drawing from the Chinese Industrial Enterprises
Database and the Directory of Chinese Outward
FDI Firms Database, which consist of 578,360
Chinese firm-year observations from 2000 to
2009, we find that (1) institutional fragility at the
provincial level associates with OFDI, which substantiates the escape argument; (2) such a relationship is weaker while firms have higher productivity
or have higher ownership controlled by state and,
(3) the relationship is stronger when firms have a
high level of export intensity.
Our study makes three contributions to the field
of international business and strategy. First, we
advance the OFDI escape argument by extending it
to emerging economies. In this way, we introduce
institutional fragility as a key concept in understanding OFDI in emerging economies. The notion
of institutional fragility is important both theoretically and empirically as it emphasizes the enabling
function rather than the inertia function of institutions. It also champions the view of a multidimensional and dynamic construct of institutions in
that different dimensions progress at different
rates. This idea greatly enriches the concept of
institutional void that prior studies on emerging
economies have constantly stressed (CuervoCazurra & Dau, 2009). The concept of institutional
fragility supplements and improves our understanding of the institutional void by examining
the effects of institutions with a multidimensional
perspective through a temporal angle. We want to
stress that institutional development is not missing
in China—the key is to focus on the incongruent
pace of institutional development as well as the
resulting clashes and resistances.
Second, the boundary conditions enrich the
theoretical underpinnings of the escape argument.
Firms, as adaptive systems (Boisot & Child, 1999),
could take heterogeneous actions to respond to
institutional fragility. The logic of how firms flow
investment out of their home countries should be
understood in conjunction with other theoretical
lenses such as political action, resource dependency, firm capabilities, and institutional theory.
Third, Witt and Lewin (2007: 579) have argued that
‘‘rigorous empirical treatment of OFDI as an escape
response from the home country has been relatively sparse in the IB literature,’’ and the majority
of prior studies on this topic provide either anecdotal or qualitative evidence. Our study helps to fill
this void.
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INSTITUTIONAL FRAGILITY
Emerging economies have become the new center
of attention in strategy research that focuses on an
institution-based view. The rapid economic reforms
in emerging economies provide a great context for
the examination of institutional change (Peng,
2003; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). These institutional
changes in emerging economies should not be
treated as static and discrete but rather as a
dynamic and interconnected process (Banalieva
et al., 2015; Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Recently, some
scholars argue that the scope of institutional reform
is important in encouraging firms’ profit maximization strategy (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Peng,
Wang, & Jiang, 2008) while others focus on the
speed at which an emerging economy moves
toward a market-based system over time (Banalieva
et al., 2015). Both the scope and speed of reform are
critical in understanding a dynamic view of institutional change. The scope of reform emphasizes
the idea that reform is multidimensional and
interconnected, while the speed of reform recognizes that institutional reform is not static but
evolves over time. Our construct of institutional
fragility incorporates both of these aspects as it
focuses on the situation in which different dimensions of institutions are not progressing at the same
pace and thus create internal friction and conflict
during institution reform.
Theoretically, our conceptualization of institutional fragility is consistent with the institutional
diversity literature (Hall & Gingerich, 2009; Hall &
Soskice, 2001; Schneider et al., 2010) and the
institutional information-space argument (Boisot
& Child, 1999). Both perspectives regard institutional reform as a process consisting of multiple
dimensions that can vary in the degree of progression (McCarthy, Lawrence, Wixted, & Gordon,
2010). According to these views, institutional
reforms should adopt a complementarity
approach in that one dimension of institutional
reform is ‘‘complementary to another when its
presence raises the returns available from the
other’’ (Hall & Gingerich, 2009: 136). For example,
Fukuyama (2014) proposes that effective governance involves the complementarity among three
sets of political institutions: the state, the rule of
law, and political accountability. However, when
such a complementary change is absent, internal
friction and conflict tend to arise within the
overall institutional reform and results in institutional fragility. Based on these arguments, both
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the institutional diversity literature and the institutional information-space perspective emphasize
the scope of reform, which pinpoints the nature of
multidimensionality and interconnectedness of
institutional reform. Both views, however, overlook the importance of the speed of reform in
driving institutional change. A more complete
dynamic view of institutions requires us to ‘‘extend the theory’s traditional focus on the static
concept of scope to consider the dynamic concept
of speed of these reforms’’ (Banalieva et al., 2015:
2). In other words, different dimensions of reform
should not only be present to support each other,
but these dimensions should also progress at a
similar pace in order to create a favorable institutional environment.
In this study, we illustrate the concept of institutional fragility using marketization reform in the
context of China. Marketization is defined as a type
of institutional reform that aims to restructure and
change the institutional environment in order to
achieve more efficient market functioning (Hoeven
& Sziráczki, 1997; Fan, Wang, & Zhu, 2007; 2010;
Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009). There are five
dimensions of marketization: the relationship
between government and business, private economy development, product market development,
factor market development, and legal system and
law service intermediaries (Fan et al., 2007; 2010).
All five dimensions are highly related to institutional development. For example, the development
of the private economy is arguably the most
important component of marketization and overall
institutional development (Bevan, Estrin, & Meyer,
2004; Sun, Shi, & Chen, 2013). An increasing
market share of privatized firms indicates a defining
institutional change in transition economies (Bonnell & Gold, 2002). Over the last two decades, the
private sector in China has expanded into a powerful growth engine along the path toward a market
economy by drastically increasing industrial output
and capital investments (Bai, Lu, & Tao, 2006).
Another integral element of institutional development is the product market, in which the reliability
of information regarding market supply and
demand directly influences firms’ ability to make
sound decisions (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Some
argue that if the product market of an emerging
economy is insufficient and unreliable, it becomes
a serious institutional void that hinders the success
of institutional development overall (Khanna,
Palepu, & Sinha, 2005). In addition, the creation
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of the factor market, indicated by the development
of banking and labor mobility, are the foundation
of economic institutional development (Khanna &
Palepu, 1997; 2000). Institutional development also
involves the development of infrastructures conducive to efficiency in operations, knowledge
acquisition, and technological development (Porter, 1990; Teece, 1986).
Specifically, we do not directly use marketization
at the provincial level to measure institutional
fragility. Instead, we treat marketization at the
provincial level as the first order of institutional
development, and institutional fragility as the
second order based on the change of marketization
at the provincial level. As the first order of institutional development, we use the marketization
index, which is a measure from the existing literature (Cordeiro, He, Conyon, & Shaw, 2013; Jia,
2014; Li & Qian, 2013; Markóczy, Sun, Peng, & Ren,
2013; Peng, Sun, & Markóczy, 2015). The index is
based on the aggregated score of five dimensions of
market reform process in China. After identifying
five sub-index indicators as major components, the
quantitative measurement of these components is
then developed to reflect the progress of the
transition toward a market economy in each
province. Overall, this method results in a comprehensive index that serves as a proxy for the
institutional development of each province (Fan
et al., 2007, 2010). We further develop a new index
from the existing literature to measure institutional
fragility as the second order. In this order, our
construct reflects the fact that different institutional dimensions are not progressing at the same
pace, which creates internal friction and conflict
during institutional development.
Although China has gone through a drastic
marketization transformation over the years—and
provinces such as Guangdong and Shanghai march
ever closer to a market-oriented economy—not all
provinces have advanced at the same rate (Fan
et al., 2007, 2010; Sun, Shi, & Chen, 2013). A more
disturbing phenomenon is that many provinces
have progressed along these five dimensions at
different paces, thus creating a misaligned restructuring process. This development represents a
provincial institutional fragility that can greatly
deter businesses from reaching their full potential.
For example, a province greatly improves its ownership structure by increasing the number of nonSOEs, thus increasing the level of marketization to a
certain extent. However, if the legal framework of
the province has not advanced at the same pace, an

explosion of legal issues would arise that revolve
around intellectual property rights, trademarks,
contract enforcements, and patents. Likewise, a
province achieves a higher level of marketization
by downsizing its government and adopts a more
hands-off approach to handling its interactions
with corporations. However, if the development of
the factor market lags behind, businesses will not
enjoy their newfound freedom because they will
not be able to receive foreign investments, hire
outside talent, or gather immigrating workers. This
increases the instability and uniformity of transactions, namely the ‘‘relational complexity’’ according to Boisot and Child (1999: 241). Magnus (2015)
further suggests ‘‘while some reforms have made
progress, many important ones affecting the role of
the state in the economy and the introduction of
market mechanisms have suffered from dilution
and the opposition of vested interests. The clampdown on civil society, media, legal and nongovernmental institutions has not helped. A strong
central authority, perversely, has stifled important
reforms, removed authority and accountability
from those institutions responsible for carrying
them out and produced conflicted decision-making’’. The discrepancy between the level of development in major marketization components leads
to firm frustration and doubt due to newfound
uncertainties in the environment. This raises the
cognitive complexity that firms must deal with in
the environment (Boisot & Child, 1999; Child &
Rodrigues, 2011). In addition, the misaligned
restructuring process creates a turbulence that
disrupts the checks and balances of existing systems, therefore weakening the institutional environment and rendering it fragile.
Furthermore, we offer the example of institutional reform in India to further clarify and
strengthen the face validity of our core construct
of institutional fragility. Although it is likely that
the specific dimensions used in our current study
will not be the same in regards to other economies,
we are confident that the idea of institutional
fragility can be observed and applied to other
emerging economies. In the case of India, institutional reforms in the private sector have been vastly
successful. In addition, in the relationship between
firms and the government, there has been a
noticeable shift in power toward firms. Unfortunately, other important areas of institutional development have not kept up at the same pace, thus
causing economic unrest and substantial losses in
efficiency and growth potential. Due to a lack of
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legal intermediaries and land purchase laws, prime
real estate locations do not contribute to meaningful projects that create jobs and prosperity. The lack
of clear and consistent labor laws also creates
tremendous problems. Many labor laws are outdated and irrelevant, and the amount of bureaucratic red tape is so confusing that many firms, in
trying to avoid the laws, are forced to hire temporary workers. As a result, less than 15% of Indian
workers enjoy legal job security (Cassidy, 2014; The
Economist, 2015).
In order to avoid and respond to the setbacks of
local institutional fragility, firms choose a variety of
tactics and strategies to overcome the hostile
environment. While the possible range of options
are endless, and the decision to pursue which
kind(s) of strategies is subject to multiple contingencies, our focus in this study is OFDI, as ‘‘one of
the available responses, as it may represent a legal
form of escape’’ in a given national context (Witt &
Lewin, 2007: 587).

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Following the abovementioned theory, we argue
that firms could make OFDI decisions to respond to
institutional fragility via two mechanisms, which
are similar to firm responses to external complexity
(Boisot & Child, 1999; Child & Rodrigues, 2011).
For instance, as institutional fragility becomes more
severe, relational complexity goes up and the costs
of fragility accumulate over time. This is usually
manifested in the form of increased transaction
cost and efficiency loss. Institutional fragility takes
the form of unbalanced progression along dimensions of marketization. For example, in certain
provinces, the product market dimension of marketization is well-developed, which encourages
market competition among the profit-maximizing
firms. However, at the same time, the legal dimension is extremely underdeveloped, which results in
deteriorating product quality by self-interested
producer, as insufficient monitoring mechanisms
cannot counter the problem of moral hazard or
adverse selection. This significantly increases the
mistrust between consumers and firms. As a result,
the reactions among data-processing agents ‘‘will
carry the risk of misunderstanding or conflicts’’
(Child & Rodrigues, 2011: 807). This leads to an
increase in relational complexity and the cost of
doing business locally will become exceptionally
high over time. Food safety issues such as the Yili
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milk scandal (Branigan, 2008), and illegally recycled waste cooking oil (Barboza, 2010) are good
examples that illustrate these points. After the
scandal, Yili, a leading milk producer with headquarters in Inner Mongolia (an institutionally
fragile province), decided to directly invest in
New Zealand in an effort to elevate consumer
confidence about product quality.
Furthermore, inconsistent market reform also
creates ambiguous and conflicting expectations
for managers (Banalieva, 2014; Kim et al., 2010),
which significantly increases their uncertainty
about future prospects—namely cognitive complexity, according to Boisot & Child (1999). For
example, as the product markets (product market
dimension of marketization) are well-established in
some provinces, the need for a higher quality factor
market (factor market dimension of marketization)
becomes increasingly important. When firms are
making competitive actions on the market, they
rely on an efficient factor market to supply sufficient financial capital and human capital (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013). However,
it is often the case that one or both aspects of the
factor markets are underdeveloped. For example, in
some provinces where product markets are well
developed, a stringent household registration system still exists (Gordon & Li, 2013) that prevents an
efficient flow of human capital from one region to
another. It is difficult for managers to grasp this
kind of inconsistency and to model ‘‘associations
between data elements’’ (Child & Rodrigues, 2011:
807). For example, Shuanghui, headquartered in
Hunan province (another institutionally fragile
province), spent $4.7 billion to acquire US-based
Smithfield Foods (the world’s largest hog farmer
and pork processor) in 2013 to gain Chinese
consumers’ food safety confidence and access the
international capital (Shuanghui offered an IPO on
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange one year later).
In summary, incongruent market reform
increases the cost of doing business locally and
elevates managers’ uncertainty regarding the
future. It raises both relational and cognitive complexity in the environment. Consequently, to
respond to fragility, firms could treat investment
across national boundaries as a new way to seek
efficiency and reduce uncertainty. Therefore all else
being equal, firms may have an incentive under
these circumstances to shift their affected functional areas or business units from the home
country to a potential target country.
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However, firms may have multiple responses to
institutional fragility. In the face of increased
institutional fragility, firms could geographically
diversify to other provinces where institutional
conditions are superior or they could work with
other companies in the same province to improve
the institutional fragility to the extent that they
can, among other options. We argue that although
internationalization theory suggests that firms tend
to occupy domestic space before entering foreign
markets, firms in China will choose to internationalize at a relatively early stage of development due
to the high transaction costs of crossing domestic
borders. Local protectionism and insufficient logistics drastically increase the costs of cross-province
investment and make the cost of crossing international borders more appealing and cost efficient
than remaining domestic (Boisot & Meyer, 2008).
As far as intellectual property rights, some provinces are biased against firms headquartered in
other provinces (Jefferson & Rawski, 2002). In
addition, logistics spending in the domestic market
in China is higher than that of the international
market because local governments often levy taxes
on operators and demand that they obtain special
licenses. This excessive red tape makes China’s
logistics spending climb to roughly 18% of GDP,
higher than any other emerging economies (India
and South Africa spend 13–14% of GDP, for example) and almost double the amount spent in the
developed world (The Economist, 2014a).
In addition, managers may consider relocating
their headquarters under institutional fragility. We
argue that it would be extremely costly for domestic
firms to mobilize top management teams and
middle managers across provinces for two reasons:
One, China still retains a Hukou system, which
prohibits smooth labor mobility (Shi, Markóczy, &
Stan, 2014a) and two, most firms are highly embedded in the local vicinity due to dialect, culture, and
political connections (Shi et al., 2014a; Sun, Peng,
Lee, & Tan, 2015). Taken together:
Hypothesis 1: Institutional fragility in a province is positively associated with the outward
foreign direct investment by the firms headquartered in that province.
We further argue that this proposed relationship
is contingent on firms’ ability to engage in institutional fragility, which depends on capability,
resource dependence, learning, and external networks. Chinese firms make strategic decisions in

terms of tangible and intangible resources to obtain
institutional advantages, which come from genuine
interactions between firms and institutions and
ensures a role for the institutions and a simultaneously superior performance for the firms (Oliver,
1997; Marquis & Raynard, 2015). In articulating the
interaction between firms and their surrounding
institutional environment, we build on the three
modes of firm engagement on external complexity:
fragility reduction, fragility penetration, and fragility mediation (Child & Rodrigues, 2011).

Fragility Reduction: Productivity as a Capability
Fragility reduction refers to a direct action that
firms take to simplify the cognitive and relational
complexity caused by the external institutional
environment. In our view, firms with high capability are able to undergo fragility reduction by
actively influencing (Child & Rodrigues, 2011) or
shaping the external environment (Courtney,
2001). By simplifying their external complexity,
firms with high capability are more cognitively in
control and more likely to identify potential external partners and other power brokers, which makes
it easier to respond to institutional fragility.
Economists often use total factor productivity to
capture firm capability based on firm output over
total input factors (including resources such as
capital, labor, technology, etc.) (Melitz, 2003; Syverson, 2011). Firms with total factor productivity are
more likely to have greater capabilities to explore,
integrate, and reconfigure existing resources with
high operational efficiency. We argue that firms
with high productivity are able to impose their own
rules to respond to relational and cognitive complexities (Child & Rodrigues, 2011) and are therefore
strongly motivated to exercise their unique innovation and operation capabilities to handle the
fragility. This seems to indicate that, all else being
equal, the relationship between institutional fragility and OFDI should be weaker for firms with a high
level of total factor productivity. In other word,
firms with high productivity that are located in a
higher institutional fragility region are likely to be
associated with fewer OFDI activities. Therefore we
propose:
Hypothesis 2: The level of total factor productivity of a focal firm negatively moderates the
positively associated relationship between institutional fragility and Chinese firms’ outward
investment.
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Fragility Penetration: State Ownership as a Form
of Resource Dependence
When cognitive complexity cannot be completely
reduced and a balance of power exists such that
focal firms cannot control their environment, firms
have to adopt the fragility penetration strategy,
that is, firms must cope with cognitive complexity
directly through engaging in relatively extensive
relational complexity (Child & Rodrigues, 2011).
Child & Rodrigues (2011) argue that if firms have
sufficient power to address cognitive complexity
and relational complexity, they can adopt the
penetration strategy. Following this logic, we
believe that SOEs have more power and channels
to respond to institutional fragility than firms with
other ownership structures because these businesses enjoy some power in the system, usually
based on possession of a large controlled asset or
specialized resources (land, bank loan, etc.). Such
power, however, is limited, as SOEs are constrained
to some extent by their strong ties with the
government. A penetration strategy involves a
direct ride with the complexity that requires firms
to work, collaborate, and learn from others through
engagement in multiple relationships within the
system. SOEs are capable of relying on their
enriched channels of communication with government and policymakers to better understand the
institutional development process in local vicinities
and therefore significantly more likely to cope with
their environment. In other words, these firms can
better understand the process of institutional
development than their non-state-owned counterparts and are able to more easily tap into government connections to navigate through the
institutional transitions and reduce the cognitional
complexity in the environment.
When faced with institutional fragility, the
strength of SOEs is their superior understanding
of their surroundings. Instead of looking for alternatives in external markets, they collaborate with
policymakers and other industry leaders and turn
institutional fragility into an advantage that is
unavailable to other firms, which makes OFDI for
SOEs a much less appealing option.
In addition, similar to the governments of other
emerging economies, the Chinese government
applies heavy regulatory restrictions on outward
foreign investment to prevent capital flight and
guide outward investments to align with national
interests (Cui & Jiang, 2010; Luo, Xue, & Han,
2010). As a result, outward investment schemes
that do not match the government’s international
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investment policies can be delayed or rejected.
Therefore Chinese firms with high state ownership
have an increased tendency to conform to, rather
than resist, local institutional fragility. Such conformity creates a reduced incentive to escape from
the local environment.
Meanwhile, state ownership creates a political
affiliation between a firm and its home-country
government, which greatly increases the firm’s
resource dependence on home-country institutions
(Cui & Jiang, 2012). Chinese firms with high levels
of state ownership rely heavily on the government
for political support and resource input. These firms
also depend on their relational ties with the government to obtain preferential support and advantages (Rugman & Li, 2007) against their competitors
who have no such governmental connections. In
addition, state ownership tends to embrace incentives other than efficiency increase or uncertainty
reduction (Okhmatovskiy, 2010). For example, SOEs
may focus on maximizing social welfare rather than
maximizing economic profits or shareholder value
(Shi, Sun, Pinkham, & Peng, 2014b). As Okhmatovskiy (2010) points out, SOEs often face greater
pressure to adopt strategies that are consistent with
the political goals of domestic institutions.
A firm’s dependence on home-country institutional constituents will significantly hinder its
motivation to resist institutional pressure (Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978). In addition, firms in emerging
economies may also mutually influence the institution or government agent to jointly mobilize
resources around a collective or industry (Child,
Rodrigues, & Tse, 2012). Therefore for Chinese
firms with high state ownership, the desire to seek
efficiency and reduce uncertainty through OFDI
will be lower. This suggests the following:
Hypothesis 3: State ownership negatively
moderates the positively associated relationship
between institutional fragility and Chinese firms’
outward investment.

Fragility Mediation: Mimetic Learning and Export
Network
Fragility mediation is a useful strategy when organizations lack the power and resources to accommodate to a complex environment. In this
situation, firms attempt to cope with environmental complexity through a reliance on other parities
(Child & Rodrigues, 2011).
Child & Rodrigues (2011: 811) suggest that firms
with little power could adapt the mediation strategy
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by obtaining ‘‘assistance from others rather than
through own direct knowledge’’ or accessing help
from ‘‘key mediators and/or networks.’’ We therefore
argue that the relationship between institutional
fragility and OFDI is contingent on mimetic learning and export networks. Simply put, when firms are
less powerful, they are not able to cope with
institutional fragility through direct knowledge.
The best option is often to follow the lead of other
firms operating in the same regional space. Therefore a high accumulated OFDI level in a province
could be associated with a high level of OFDI
activities. In any given organizational field, there
exist sets of formal and informal rules that govern
socially acceptable organizational structures and
actions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1997).
Managers often rely on mimetic and normative
guidelines rooted in taken-for-granted assumptions
to make strategic choices, especially in mediating
both relational complexity and cognitive complexity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Peng et al., 2008). In
order for a firm to gain legitimacy and reduce
fragility in its business environment, it must understand and conform to the local normative system to
prevent the loss of brand value and preserve a
positive social image (Zaheer, 1995). Depending on
the number of firms making outward investments in
the local organizational field, the level of legitimacy
a firm enjoys varies when making these investment
decisions as a response to institutional fragility.
Consequently, OFDI as an option to seek uncertainty reduction will be less attractive to firms whose
surrounding peers or reference groups (Haveman &
Wang, 2013) do not draw on that option. Therefore
we suggest the following:
Hypothesis 4a: The number of outward foreign direct investments accumulated in the previous year of the same province positively
moderates the positively associated relationship
between institutional fragility and firms’ outward
foreign direct investments.
Finally, we argue that the above association
presented in H1 is also contingent on the firms’
export network to conduct business in foreign
countries. Child & Rodrigues (2011) propose that
firms can cope with relational complexity by
getting help from mediators and networks such as
‘‘external partners, focused networks, or powerful
client organizations,’’ which can bring information
and help a focal firm to interpret the information.
We then argue that a focal firm’s export network

could increase the associated relationship in H1. An
export network provides valuable information on
foreign markets in terms of consumer preferences,
government policies, and legal and institutional
frameworks (Lecraw, 1981; Filatotchev, Liu, Buck,
& Wright, 2009). With this knowledge, the focal
firm can more accurately assess the likelihood of
success for potential outward investment projects.
Furthermore, an export network can lead to the
formation of distribution and marketing networks
in the target foreign locations, which helps to
reduce cognitive complexity in investing at the
same locations (Pradhan, 2004; Wells, 1983).
Export networks also help firms reduce relational
complexity overseas (Child & Rodrigues, 2011) and
push firms to make OFDI decisions to respond to
institutional fragility. In addition, firms with dense
export networks also have a high export intensity
that represents the extent to which exports contribute to a firm’s sales (Estrin, Meyer, Wright, &
Foliano, 2008; Salomon & Shaver, 2005). If a focal
firm’s export intensity could proxy its export
network, we argue the following.
Hypothesis 4b: The level of export intensity of
a focal firm positively moderates the positively
associated relationship between institutional fragility and the firm’s outward foreign direct
investment.

METHODS
Data and Sample
Our empirical analysis is based on data collected
from two datasets, the Chinese industrial Enterprises Database (CIED) collected by the National
Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) and the
Directory of Chinese Outward FDI firms (DCOFDI)
published by the Ministry of Commerce of the
People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM). The first
dataset contains detailed financial and performance
records of mid-to-large-scale Chinese industrial
firms whose annual sales are over 5 million RMB,
and the second dataset records information of
16,260 OFDI transactions that have occurred since
the data became available in 2000.1
According to the period range of the core institutional variable—i.e., Fragility—we first select
panel data from CIED between 2000 and 2009
and combine it with the DCOFDI based on domestic firm names. During the raw data cleanup
process, we exclude observations with incomplete
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key firm characters (i.e., age, size, capital, employee,
production value, etc.) and tax haven cases (Peng,
Sun, & Blevins, 2011; Sutherland & Anderson, 2014).
Our panel sample (unbalanced) consists of 698,108
firm-year observations among which 1,748 firms
made 2,274 outward transactions between years
2000 and 2009. Out of the total 2,274 transactions,
1,726 were from target firms in developed economies
and 548 were from target firms in emerging economies. Given that all transactions within DCOFDI are
perceived as complete, we merge each OFDI firm into
CIED in the year in which the focal transaction of the
OFDI is approved. After lagging one year for all of our
main, moderator, and control variables in the
regression model, we have 578,360 firm-year observations in our final sample.

applied in management research (Chang & Wu,
2014; Shi et al., 2012; Sun, Yang, & Li, 2014). There
are five dimensions (Sub-index) within the marketization index: (1) business-government interfaces;
(2) development of private firms; (3) development
of product markets; (4) development of factor
markets; and (5) development of market and legal
intermediaries (Fan et al., 2010; Sun, Shi, & Chen,
2013). The construction of whole index is similar
to the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic
Freedom.
We first calculate the ‘‘pace of change’’ of each of
sub-index among 30 provinces in our sample:

DReform Sub-indexjrt ¼ Reform Sub-indexjrt

ð1Þ
Reform Sub-indexjrt1 

Measures

DReform Sub-indexjrt captures the absolute value of
the sub-indexj change from the year t-1 to the year
t in the jth dimension of sub-index and in the rth
province.
We calculate how the change in one sub-index is
related to the change in all five dimensions as a
whole:

Dependent variable
OFDI Following the OFDI literature (Gao, Murray,
Kotabe, & Lu, 2010, Liang, Ren, & Sun, 2015, Sun
et al., 2015), we build a firm-level dummy variable
OFDIikrt with a value of 1 to indicate an OFDI
transaction by the firm i in industry k from province
r in year t, and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable
approach captures a firm’s OFDI decision-making in
the first step, that is, whether to go global. The
literature suggests that firms make strategic choices
in going global under this decision tree: the first
step, they decide whether to go global; and in the
second step, they determine other OFDI considerations such as location, the amount of OFDI
(Duanmu, 2014), the level of internationalization
(Liang et al., 2015; Sun et al., 2015), and entry
modes (Aharoni, Tihanyi, & Connelly, 2011; Peng,
2012; Tallman & Shenkar, 1994). Without the first
step—the decision on whether to go global—firms
will not move on to subsequent decisions. To this
end, we treat whether to engage in OFDI as the most
important strategic choice (Child, 1972) and examine the relationship between institutional fragility
and this OFDI decision.
Independent variable
Institutional Fragility This is a province-level variable. Market-based reforms in China vary among
different provinces (Jia, 2014; Shi, Sun, & Peng,
2012). The National Economic Research Institute
(NERI) developed a series of comprehensive
indexes to capture the multiple dimensions of
reform across provinces and years. One such
index is the marketization index, which is widely
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DReform Sub-indexjrt
DRjrt ¼ P5
j¼1 DReform Sub-indexjrt

ð2Þ

After adjusting by the sum of five dimensions of
sub-index changes, DRjrt does not relate to the scale
of any sub-index.
We then apply an entropy formula to capture the
synchronization of pace of change under the five
dimensions (Banalieva, 2014; Frenken, 2006;
Robins & Wiersema, 2003). Entropy formula is
 
5
P
DRjrt  Ln DR1jrt . We then define institugiven by
j¼1

tional fragility as the following:
Institutional Fragilityrt ¼ Maxt 

 Ln

5
X

DRjrt

j¼1


1
:
DRjrt

ð3Þ

where Maxt is the largest synchronization values
from entropy formula among all provinces in year
t. The higher the Institutional Fragility score, the
higher degree of institutional fragility in the rth
province in the year t.
Our fragility measure differs from the approach
used by Ault & Spicer (2014), who simply combine
the six dimensions of Worldwide Governance
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Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007)
into a single measure of ‘‘state fragility.’’ They claim
that ‘‘the simultaneous breakdown of multiple
institutional factors in a country stems from a
single cause: the failure of the state to act in the
public interest’’ (Ault & Spicer, 2014: 10). We argue
that such a simple combination approach does not
capture the pace of change of multiple institutional
dimensions, which is critical for our institution
theory in this study. Instead, our entropy approach
fully captures the institutional fragility in which
reforms encompass five different dimensions. For
instance, according to Eq. (1), Beijing has DReform
Sub-indexjBeijing2009 of (0.19, 0.67, 0.01, 0.26, 2.04) in
2009; After scaling by the sum of above DReform
Sub-indexjBeijing2009 with 3.17, the array of
0.644),
DRjBeijing2009 is (0.060, 0.211, 0.003, 0.082,


1
according to Eq. (2); Then we get Ln DRjBeijing2009 as
(2.814, 1.554, 5.759,
2.501, 0.441); Using the
5
P
1
entropy formula,
DRjBeijing2009  Ln DRjBeijing2009
=
j¼1

0.060*(2.814) + 0.211*(1.554) + 0.003*(5.759) +
0.082*(2.501) + 0.644*(0.441) = 1.004; In the sample
of year 2009, we get Max2009 as 1.295 from Shaanxi.
Finally, following the inverse entropy Eq. (3), we
obtain the institutional fragility index for Beijing in


5
P
1
DRjBeijing2009  Ln DRjBeijing2009
=
2009 as Max2009 j¼1

1.295 - 1.004 = 0.291. In this way, Institutional
Fragility captures the incongruent pace of institutional change in the second order, not the institutional improvement in the first order (the original
Marketization Index is 9.87). Similarly, we recalculate the yearly fragility index in other provinces.

LnYit ¼ LnAit þ b1 LnKit þ b2 LnLit þ b3 LnMit
Therefore the estimated LnAit is
LnAit ¼ b0 þ eit

b

b

b

Yit ¼ Ait F ðKit ; Lit ; Mit Þ ¼ Ait Kit1 Lit2 Mit3

ð4Þ

where Yit is output of firm i in year t, F () is a
function of observable inputs capital Kit, labor Lit,
and intermediate materials Mit, and a factor-neutral
shifter Ait (Syverson, 2011; Van Beveren, 2012).
After a natural logarithm conversion2, we have

ð6Þ

The first term b0 is mean efficiency level across
the firms and years in the sample; and the second eit
is firm i’s specific deviation (or idiosyncratic capability) from that mean in year t. Since eit has two
components: a predictable xit and an unexpected
q
deviation uit , representing stochastic error (Lu &
Lian, 2012; Syverson, 2011; Van Beveren, 2012), we
replace logarithm production function (5) as
q

LnYit ¼ b0 þ b1 LnKit þ b2 LnLit þ b3 LnMit þ xit þ uit
ð7Þ
Here, the firm-level TFP can thus be estimated as:
dit ¼ LnYit  b LnKit  b LnLit  b LnMit .
TFP
1
2
3
We measure Yit as the firm i’s value-added output,
which is calculated as the firm i’s total output over
the intermediate material input in year t by The
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) (www.
stats.gov.cn/tjzs/tjbk/nsbzb/201402/P0201402265
59332052330.pdf). Since the intermediate material
input data (2004–2006) is not available in the NBSC
dataset, Lu and Lian (2012) suggest using value-added
output instead of revenue as Yit in the left side of
formula (7) and omit Mit in the right side. Capital Kit is
measured by the firm i’s value of fixed asset, and labor
(Lit) as its total number of employee. Then, we have
dit ¼ LnðValue  added OutputÞ
TFP
it
 b^ LnðFixed Asset Þ b^ LnðEmployeeÞ
1

Moderator variables
Total Factor Productivity Total factor productivity
(TFP) is widely used in international economics
literature to measure production efficiency in either
firm-level or macro-level (Ozyurt, 2009; Wang,
Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012). We focus on
TFP in the firm level based on a fixed set of inputs,
following the Cobb–Douglas production function
(Javorcik, 2004; Syverson, 2011):

ð5Þ

it

2

ð8Þ
it

In a sample of 578,360 firm-year observations, we
have performed standard OLS regression on the
firm i’s value-added output in year t as the dependit .
dent variable and then estimated firm-level TFP
SOE Ownership A state-owned enterprise’s (SOE)
ownership is measured by the percentage of ownership controlled by the government (Liang et al.,
2015). It is on the firm-level.
Mimetic Learning We measure mimetic learning as
the accumulated number of OFDI transactions in a
given year t and in a province r wherein participants
in transactions have their headquarters hosted in
the same provinces with the focal firm. Institution
theory and empirical evidence suggests that a focal
firm could treat firms that are headquartered within
the same provinces as reference groups and imitate
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their OFDI decisions (Haveman & Wang, 2013). It is
a province-level variable.
Export Intensity We measure export intensity as
the ratio of export sales to total sales by a firm in a
given year (Gao et al., 2010). It is a firm-level
measure. Following the Uppsala internationalization process model, firms with high export intensity could have strong motivation to engage in
OFDI (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Firms with high
export intensity also develop foreign partners and
networks, which makes outward investment projects more feasible (Czinkota, 1996).

Control Variables
We control for many important variables on the
regional level, industry level, and firm level that
may influence a firm’s OFDI behavior. These variables include: (1) Industry Dummies we follow
NBSC’s industry classification standard and assign
every industry at two-digit classification level a
dummy value (a total of 29 manufacturing industries); (2) Marketization Index developed by the
National Economic Research Institute (NERI). The
details of Index construction can be found in the
previous section on the measure of Institutional
Fragility (Fan et al., 2007, 2010); (3) GDP per Capita
the natural logarithm of GDP per capita; (4) Inward
FDI the amount of annual FDI flow received by the
focal province adjusted by local GDP (Sun et al.,
2015); (5) Firm Age number of years since establishment in the form natural logarithm; (6) Firm Size
the natural logarithm of total employees3; (7)
Capital Intensity the ratio of capital expenses to
total sales. A firm’s financing capability could affect
its resource location and strategic investments such
as OFDI (Hoskisson et al., 2013); (8) Slack the ratio
of total interest payments to total outstanding
long-term liability. This potential slack could constrain a firm’s financing and investment decisions
(Yang, Narayanan, & De Carolis, 2014); and (9) Year
Dummies Note that variable (1) is on the industry
level, variables (2)–(4) are on the province level,
and variables (5)–(8) are on the firm level. All of the
abovementioned firm-and-province-level control
variables are time variant through the sample years,
with the exception of Industry Dummies.
Additional Variables for the Post Hoc Test
Governance Distance We further use Governance
Distance as a dependent variable in the Post-hoc
test. As there is no consensus in the literature on the
best way to measure Governance Distance (Berry,
Guillen, & Zhou, 2010; Gaffney, Karst, & Clampit,
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2016; Gaur & Lu, 2007), we select the most widely
adopted approach developed by Kogut & Singh
(1988). It is calculated by the Euclidean distance of
six dimensions of Worldwide Governance Indicators (these include Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and
Control of Corruption, developed by the World
Bank, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
index.aspx#home) between host country and
home country (Hutzschenreuter, Kleindienst, &
Lange, 2014). The Governance Distance variable is
on the firm level based on the manager’s FDI location decision (Xu & Shenkar, 2002).
Strategy Motivation Eclectic theory (Dunning, 1980)
identifies these primary motivations of OFDI: (1)
Strategic Asset the dummy equals 1 if the major scope
of OFDI is related to RandD and 0 if otherwise; (2)
Efficiency the dummy equals 1 if the major scope of
OFDI is related to production (cost reduction); (3)
Market Seeking the dummy equals 1 if the major scope
of OFDI is related to sales and marketing; (4) Service
the dummy equals 1 if the major scope of OFDI is
related to services other than sales and RandD; and
(5) Resource Seeking the dummy equals 1 if the major
scope of OFDI is related to mining and extraction
(Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng, 2007;
Deng, 2013; Sun, Peng, Ren, & Yan, Sun et al., 2012).
These are firm-level variables available in the business description section in the DCOFDI dataset,
made available when Chinese firms report their
OFDI activities to the Ministry of Commerce of the
People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM).
Host Country Variables We follow the approach by
Buckley et al. (2007) to control for these variables:
(6) Inflation as measured by the host country
annual inflation rate; (7) GDP measured by the
host country GDP (log value) to capture the absolute market size; (8) GDP Per Capita measured by
the host country GDP per capita (log value); (9)
Exchange Rate measured by the host country official
annual average real effective exchange rate against
China’s RMB (fixed to dollar); (10) Natural Resource
measured by the ratio of ore and metal exports to
merchandise exports of the host country; (11)
Openness to FDI measured by the ratio of inward
FDI stock to the host GDP; and (12) Political Risk
measured by the host country’s political risk rating
average from 2005 to 2013 (higher values indicate
greater stability). These variables are on the country
level. Variables 6–10 are collected from the World
Bank Development Indicators, variable 11 is collected from the UNCTAD FDI database, and
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variable 12 is collected from the Country Risk
Guide Database. These are country-level variables.

Econometric Estimation
To identify the relationship between institutional
fragility and a firm’s OFDI decision, we construct a
probit model to investigate the underlying mechanisms of an OFDI decision:
PðOFDIikrt ¼ 1jXÞ ¼U b0 þ b1 InstitutionalFragilityrt1 :
þ b2 TFPit1 þ b3 TFPit1
 InstitutionalFragilityrt1
þ b4 SOEit1 þ b5 SOEit1
 InstitutionalFragilityrt1
þ b6 Mimetic Learningit1
þ b7 Mimetic Learningit1
 InstitutionalFragilityrt1

/ðFitÞ
if OFDIikrt ¼ 1
UðFitÞ
/ðFitÞ
if OFDIikrt ¼ 0
and ¼ 
1  UðFitÞ
ð10Þ

Inverse Mills Ratio ¼

þ b8 Exportit1 þ b9 Exportit1
 InstitutionalFragilityrt1
þ b10 GDP PerCapitart1
þ b11 Inward FDIrt1
þ b12 Marketization Indexrt1
þ b13 Firm Ageit1 þ b14 Firm Sizeit1
þb15 Capital Intensityit1
þ b16 Slackit1 þ

9
X

btþ16 Yeart

t¼1

þ

28
X

bkþ25 Industryk

k¼1

þ

29
X

be affected by the first step of a firm’s OFDI decision
due to selection bias. Specifically, the strategic
choices of internationalization could be made in
sequenced stages, i.e., first whether or not to OFDI,
and then where to OFDI (Peng, 2012; Tallman &
Shenkar, 1994). The first sample of the firms in the
first step is larger than the second sample of the
firms in the second step. If the observable pattern of
OFDI location choices by the focal firm is related to
the smaller second sample of firms which have
decided to go abroad, in other words, the second
sample is not randomly selected. this selection bias
probably affect the estimation (Heckman, 1979;
Reeb, Sakakibara, & Mahmood, 2012). Following a
similar model of two-step decision-making in internationalziation (Gao et al., 2010; Liang et al., 2015;
Sun et al., 2015), we calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio
(IMR) from the first step of a firm’s OFDI decision:

!
brþ53 Provincer

where Fit is the fitted value computed from the first
step of the OFDI regression, / represents the probability density function of the normal distribution,
and U represents the cumulative distribution
function of the normal distribution. We then add
this ratio as a control variable in the second-step
decision model in our post hoc analysis. The twostep model could effectively control for the potential non-random treatment issue (Liang et al., 2015;
Reeb et al., 2012).

r¼1

ð9Þ
where U represents how the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution.
In this longitudinal study, we set a Chinese firm’s
OFDI behavior in a repeated measures design. Since
the population-averaged model could account for
the dependency and correlation between the
repeated measure sufficiently (Hubbard et al.,
2010) and estimate the variance of the coefficients
robustly (Hu, Goldberg, Hedeker, Flay, & Pentz,
1998), we apply the Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) population-averaged probit model to
analyze the binary-dependent variable OFDI.
In the post hoc analysis, we further test what
determines the host country choice, namely, the
second step of firms’ OFDI decision. This step could

FINDINGS
Table 1 (full sample, N = 578,360) and Table 2
(OFDI sample, N = 2,274, for post hoc test III)
present the descriptive statistics and correlation
metrics. The correlation table suggests a potential
multicollinearity issue. We then calculate the variation inflation factor (VIF) in Model 2 in Table 3 and
find that the value is 7.46, which is lower than the
threshold level of 10. To further reduce the multicollinearity issue in testing interaction effects, we
mean-center the province-level main variable Institutional Fragility and moderator Mimetic Learning,
and within-province-mean center other three firmlevel moderators, TFP, SOE Ownership, and Export
Intensity to capture the cross-level interactions
(Banalieva et al., 2015; Li & Tang, 2010).
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1.000
-0.170
-0.121
0.097
-0.055
7.670
2.152
1.000
0.713
-0.096
-0.090
-0.063
-0.051
3.548
0.846

Journal of International Business Studies

Note: Correlations above |.12| and significant at the .05 level are in bold typeface. N = 578,360.

1.000
0.677
0.892
-0.151
-0.100
0.183
-0.081
2.272
0.062
1.000
0.190
0.167
0.218
0.003
0.251
0.022
-0.038
0.288
0.453
1.000
0.116
0.689
0.412
0.743
-0.130
-0.104
0.037
-0.026
2.003
1.928
1.000
-0.147
-0.088
-0.304
-0.103
-0.338
0.273
0.148
-0.042
-0.097
0.057
0.221
1.000
-0.334
0.220
0.133
0.269
0.188
0.286
-0.173
-0.025
0.097
0.092
1.659
0.253
1.000
-0.052
-0.031
0.293
-0.016
-0.119
-0.153
-0.201
0.038
0.122
-0.368
0.011
0.251
0.163
1.000
0.024
0.025
-0.009
0.053
0.039
0.037
0.014
0.035
0.005
0.038
-0.003
0.003
0.004
0.041
OFDI
Institutional Fragility
TFP
SOE Ownership
Mimetic Learning
Export Intensity
GDP per Capita
Inward FDI
Marketization Index
Firm Age
Firm Size
Capital Intensity
Slack
Mean
Std. Dev.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

4
3
2
1
Variables

Table 1 Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation matrix (full sample)

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.000
0.237
-0.079
-0.021
1.907
0.971

11

1.000
0.123
-0.086
5.058
1.013

12

1.000
-0.053
4.450
2.086

13

1.000
-3.991
1.470

464

Table 3 shows the results of GEE PopulationAveraged Models on OFDI. Model 1 serves as the
baseline model. Hypothesis 1 suggests that institutional fragility is positively associated to the likelihood of OFDI. The coefficient of institutional
fragility is significantly positive (b = 0.466,
p \ 0.001). The coefficients of institutional fragility
remain positive and significant in model 2 to 7.
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 receives strong support.
We examine Hypothesis 2 by adding the third
interaction term, Fragility* TFP, in Model 3. The
results in Table 3 indicate that the coefficient of
this interaction term is -0.113 (p \ 0.001). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 receives strong support.
We then add the first interaction term, Fragility*
SOE Ownership, in Model 4. The coefficient of this
interaction term is significantly negative (b = -0.814,
p \ 0.001). It suggests that SOE ownership is less
associated with institutional fragility in an OFDI
decision. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is also supported.
We then add the second interaction term,
Fragility* Mimetic Learning, in Model 5. The coefficient of this interaction term is positive
(b = 0.237), but insignificant. Therefore, Hypothesis 4a is not supported.
In Model 6, we add the fourth interaction
term, Fragility* Export Intensity. The coefficient of
this interaction term is positive and significant
(b = 0.636, p \ 0.001), which indicates that firms
with high export intensity amplify the association
between institutional fragility and an OFDI decision. This result supports Hypothesis 4b.
Finally, we add all four interaction terms into
Model 7. The results in Model 7 suggest that three
coefficients of the interaction terms, Fragility* TFP
(b = -0.137, p \ 0.001), Fragility* SOE Ownership
(b = - 0.774, p \ 0.01), and Fragility* Export Intensity (b = 0.682, p \ 0.001) are robustly significant.
This model suggests that Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4b
are still supported.
We further check the test statistics (Wald chi2) in
Models 1–7 for model fit. After adding the interaction terms in model 2 to model 7, Wald chi2 scores
have risen modestly in Models 2–7. In this comparison, we find that these interaction terms
improve the model fit on Wald chi2 test noticeably.

Post-Hoc Test I
Since the probit model is ‘‘intrinsically nonlinear,’’
‘‘an explanatory variable’s estimated coefficient can
rarely be used to infer the true nature of the
relationship between the explanatory variable and
the dependent variable’’ (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009:

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Slack
Strategic Assets
Efficiency
Market Seeking
Service
Resource Seeking
Inflation (Host)
GDP (Host)
GDP Per Capita(Host)
Exchange Rate
Natural Resources
Openness to FDI

Variables

Governance Distance
Institutional Fragility
TFP
SOE Ownership
Mimetic Learning
Export Intensity
GDP Per Capita(home)
Inward FDI
Marketization Index
Firm Age
Firm Size
Capital Intensity
Slack
Strategic Assets
Efficiency
Market Seeking
Service
Resource Seeking
Inflation (Host)
GDP (Host)
GDP Per Capita(Host)
Exchange Rate
Natural Resources
Openness to FDI
Political Risk
Mean
Std. Dev.

Variables

1
-0.038
-0.007
0.088
-0.044
-0.067
-0.001
0.027
0.041
-0.010
-0.024
0.018

13

1.000
0.042
-0.010
-0.045
-0.008
0.064
0.026
0.089
0.091
0.005
-0.012
0.018
0.020
0.205
-0.274
0.302
-0.110
-0.149
-0.586
0.026
0.026
-0.375
0.090
0.296
-0.106
2.013
1.318

1

1.000
-0.121
-0.181
-0.211
-0.056
-0.140
0.151
0.149
-0.067
-0.027
0.132

14

1.000
-0.060
-0.153
0.361
-0.091
0.058
-0.132
-0.173
0.051
0.103
-0.062
0.051
0.001
0.053
0.024
-0.032
0.063
0.282
-0.012
0.033
-0.001
0.032
0.054
0.062
0.245
0.171

2

1.000
-0.317
-0.370
-0.098
0.198
-0.208
-0.335
0.177
0.003
-0.103

15

1.000
0.031
0.102
0.157
0.047
-0.139
-0.134
0.177
0.371
0.014
0.075
0.002
-0.049
0.074
-0.083
0.098
0.047
-0.046
-0.035
-0.038
0.087
0.038
0.034
1.820
0.148

3

1.000
-0.552
-0.147
-0.224
0.191
0.322
-0.186
0.002
0.187

16

1.000
-0.017
-0.093
-0.171
-0.088
-0.138
0.119
0.205
-0.072
-0.069
-0.001
-0.019
-0.038
0.028
0.051
0.004
-0.171
-0.171
-0.010
0.014
0.014
0.006
0.026
0.124

4

4

1.000
-0.171
0.078
-0.042
-0.043
0.058
-0.016
-0.142

17

0.102
0.157
0.047
-0.139
-0.134
0.177
0.371
0.014
0.075
0.002
-0.049
0.074
-0.083
0.098
0.047
-0.046
-0.035
-0.038
0.087
0.038
0.034
1.820
0.148

Table 2 Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation matrix (OFDI sample)

1.000
0.112
-0.133
-0.187
0.037
0.037
-0.048

18

1.000
0.250
0.631
0.253
0.674
0.073
0.155
0.109
-0.051
-0.070
-0.217
0.053
0.237
-0.211
-0.006
0.031
0.631
-0.071
0.011
0.094
0.031
4.801
1.414

5

1.000
-0.385
-0.612
0.299
0.040
-0.260

19

1.000
0.095
0.075
0.154
0.105
0.290
0.001
-0.008
0.028
-0.082
-0.017
0.091
-0.070
-0.008
0.015
0.025
-0.082
0.007
-0.012
-0.053
0.803
0.398

6

1.000
0.650
0.299
0.040
-0.260

20

1.000
0.439
0.589
-0.096
-0.017
0.070
0.084
0.029
-0.009
0.139
-0.090
-0.239
0.150
-0.073
-0.003
-0.051
0.025
0.172
0.020
9.830
0.698

7

1.000
-0.269
-0.103
-0.184

21

1.000
0.705
-0.278
-0.120
-0.078
-0.008
0.023
-0.019
0.037
0.060
-0.292
-0.082
0.017
0.041
-0.042
-0.066
0.075
-0.019
3.723
0.722

8

1.000
-0.118
-0.133

22

1.000
-0.195
-0.147
0.061
0.038
-0.028
-0.089
0.091
0.086
-0.282
-0.051
0.008
0.026
-0.009
-0.023
0.072
-0.040
2.230
0.218

9

1.000
0.004

23

1.000
0.392
0.180
0.065
0.010
-0.070
-0.001
0.010
0.115
0.036
-0.023
-0.008
0.008
0.037
-0.030
0.030
2.166
0.667

10

1.000

24

1.000
0.156
-0.024
0.067
-0.126
0.043
-0.007
0.034
-0.009
-0.059
-0.017
-0.127
0.045
0.054
0.025
6.490
1.327

11

25

1.000
-0.098
0.035
-0.048
0.052
-0.055
0.027
-0.069
-0.045
-0.022
-0.009
0.044
0.053
0.091
5.203
2.270

12
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-0.050
5.507
8.965
0.127
1.284
3.948
-0.265
9.349
1.530

0.304
0.109
0.223

1.000
8.979
1.637

682). This means that the value of an independent
variable’s marginal effect is not constant. Therefore, Wiersema and Bowen (2009) suggest that a
graphical approach to depicting the moderating
effect is not appropriate and instead recommend
testing the significant level of the independent
variable’s marginal effect. We then follow their
method to compute Institutional Fragility’s marginal effect at the low, mean, and high values of the
four moderators. The results show that the values of
the z-statistic are very high, and that all min, mean,
and max values of three moderators (TFP, SOE
Ownership, and Export Intensity) have significant
impacts on Institutional Fragility’s marginal effect.
These results further support H2, H3, and H4b.4

Note: Correlations above |.12| and significant at the .05 level are in bold typeface. N = 2,274.

0.016
0.392
0.488
25

Political Risk
Mean
Std. Dev.

-0.037
-3.918
1.063

-0.090
0.066
0.246

-0.002
0.175
0.38

0.003
0.321
0.467

0.054
0.044
0.204

0.111
5.060
5.434

0.111
26.730
2.014

23
22
17
Variables

Table 2 (Continued)

13

14

15

16

18

19

20

21

24

25
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Post-Hoc Test II
The literature suggests that firms within the same
province in China share similar dialect, employee,
and institutions (Peng et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2012; Sun
et al., 2015), in other words, they are nested in the
province level. To address this potential spatial
dependency bias, we follow Lederman (2010) and
apply a two-level estimation in below two stages. In
the first stage, we predict the probability of OFDIs
using probit model including all firm-level characteristics (both moderators and controls). In the second
stage, we use the region-average predicted probability
of OFDI (generated by the results of first stages) as a
dependent variable to further explore the relationship between institutional fragility and an OFDI
decision in the province level. We find that coefficient
in province level still receives the robust support.5
Post-Hoc Test III
We further treat governance distance as a dependent variable to test how the level of institutional
fragility will associate with the focal firm’s location
choices of observed OFDI transactions, which is the
second step of the firm OFDI decision model. The
results are demonstrated in Table 4. In this second
step of the firm OFDI decision model, we include
the main and control variables in the first-step firm
OFDI decision model as well as Strategy Motivations
and Inverse Mills Ratio (which is generated from the
first step model) in Models 8 and 10; then we
further add Host Country Variables in Model 9 and
11. The results of random-effects GLS regression
models on governance distance are shown in
Table 4. In Model 8, we include all OFDI samples
(N = 1,668, due to missing values in some variables) and find that Institutional Fragility is significantly positively associated with country choice
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Table 3 Results of GEE population-averaged models on OFDI

Model 1
Main variable
Institutional Fragility (H1)
Interactions
Fragility * TFP
(H2)
Fragility* SOE Ownership
(H3)
Fragility * Mimetic
Learning (H4a)
Fragility* Export
Intensity (H4b)
Moderator variables
TFP
SOE ownership
Mimetic learning
Export intensity
Control variables
GDP Per Capita
Inward FDI
Marketization Index
Firm age
Firm size
Capital intensity
Slack
Year, industry, and province
effects
Constant
Wald chi2
N

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

0.466***
(0.058)

0.473***
(0.059)

0.495***
(0.059)

0.439***
(0.065)

0.251***
(0.069)

0.241***
(0.079)

0.636***
(0.122)

-0.137***
(0.029)
-0.774**
(0.326)
0.281
(0.327)
0.682***
(0.127)

-0.113***
(0.029)
-0.814***
(0.316)
0.237
(0.321)

0.546***
(0.054)
-0.205***
(0.058)
0.064***
(0.005)
0.269***
(0.017)

0.556***
(0.071)
-0.147**
(0.069)
0.089***
(0.007)
0.261***
(0.027)

0.559***
(0.071)
-0.139**
(0.068)
0.090***
(0.007)
0.260***
(0.027)

0.550***
(0.071)
-1.188***
(0.426)
0.090***
(0.007)
0.260***
(0.027)

0.541***
(0.072)
-0.150**
(0.070)
0.081***
(0.007)
0.271***
(0.027)

0.557***
(0.070)
-0.145**
(0.067)
0.088***
(0.007)
1.023***
(0.146)

0.533***
(0.072)
-1.135***
(0.438)
0.079***
(0.007)
1.088***
(0.153)

0.040**
(0.013)
-0.101***
(0.019)
0.711***
(0.077)
0.087***
(0.011)
0.213***
(0.008)
-0.011***
(0.003)
0.031***
(0.005)
Controlled

-0.307***
(0.031)
-0.133***
(0.026)
0.519***
(0.115)
0.118***
(0.014)
0.227***
(0.011)
-0.011**
(0.005)
0.042***
(0.007)
Controlled

-0.307***
(0.031)
-0.132***
(0.026)
0.620***
(0.115)
0.118***
(0.014)
0.227***
(0.011)
-0.011**
(0.005)
0.042***
(0.007)
Controlled

-0.307***
(0.031)
-0.130***
(0.026)
0.514***
(0.115)
0.118***
(0.014)
0.228***
(0.011)
-0.011**
(0.005)
0.041***
(0.007)
Controlled

-0.289***
(0.032)
-0.152***
(0.027)
0.616***
(0.117)
0.115***
(0.014)
0.228***
(0.011)
-0.008*
(0.005)
0.043***
(0.007)
Controlled

-0.308***
(0.031)
-0.129***
(0.026)
0.536***
(0.114)
0.117***
(0.014)
0.227***
(0.011)
-0.010**
(0.005)
0.040***
(0.007)
Controlled

-0.287***
(0.031)
-0.147***
(0.027)
0.449***
(0.117)
0.112***
(0.014)
0.229***
(0.011)
-0.007
(0.005)
0.041***
(0.007)
Controlled

-6.814***
(0.201)
2909.94***
578,360

-4.264***
(0.306)
2949.38***
578,360

-4.278***
(0.306)
2965.26***
578,360

-4.226***
(0.307)
2962.09***
578,360

-4.526***
(0.317)
2950.31***
578,360

-4.566***
(0.309)
2957.30***
578,360

-4.590***
(0.321)
2989.87***
578,360

Note: p \ .1; * p \ .05; ** p \ .01; *** p \ .001. Standardized errors are in parentheses. Due to space limitations, we omit the coefficient estimates of
the year- and industry-dummy variables in this table.

(b = 0.316, p \ 0.05). However, after adding Host
Country Variables in Model 9, its significance disappears. This seems to indicate that OFDI strategy
could be a collective of sub-decisions on location
choice, FDI amount, entry mode, etc.
In Models 10–11, we only include OFDI samples
targeting developed economies.6 The coefficient of
Fragility becomes more positive in Model 10
(b = 0.373, p \ 0.05). These results suggest that

Fragility is positively associated with Governance
Distance when Chinese firms choose the developed
economies as OFDI destinations. In OFDI decision
tree, managers first scan some regions or countries
to invest. At this step, institutional fragility is a
critical decision variable on governance distance
(Models 8 and 10). However, after the managers
decide upon the region to invest in, they then
select the specific country based on Host Country
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Table 4 Results of random-effects GLS models on governance distance

Main variable
Institutional Fragility
Control variables
TFP
SOE ownership
Mimetic learning
Export Intensity
GDP Per Capita
(Home)
Inward FDI (Home)
Marketization Index
Firm Age
Firm Size
Capital Intensity
Slack
Strategic Asset
Efficiency
Market Seeking
Service

Model 8
(All OFDIs
sample)

Model 9
(All OFDIs
sample)

Model 10
(OFDIs targeting
developed)

Model 11
(OFDIs targeting
developed)

0.316*
(0.133)

-0.002
(0.058)

0.373*
(0.149)

-0.025
(0.074)

0.129
(0.196)
0.175
(0.272)
-0.228
(0.129)
0.143
(0.079)
-0.063
(0.167)
-0.017
(0.143)
1.648**
(0.537)
-0.115
(0.068)
-0.025
(0.036)
0.136*
(0.058)
0.056
(0.048)
1.956***
(0.238)
-0.139
(0.176)
1.586***
(0.237)
0.669***
(0.192)

-0.148
(0.113)
0.259*
(0.126)
0.143*
(0.068)
-0.048
(0.037)
-0.158*
(0.076)
0.046
(0.067)
-0.549
(0.332)
0.078
(0.043)
0.004
(0.012)
-0.058
(0.034)
0.001
(0.009)
0.183
(0.107)
0.019
(0.146)
-0.069
(0.143)
0.142
(0.127)
3.436
(5.259)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.763***
(0.011)
-0.043
(0.042)
0.028***
(0.003)
5.257***
(0.876)
-0.064***
(0.014)
0.829*
(0.373)
Controlled
1.978**
(0.683)

0.167
(0.253)
0.273
(0.284)
0.018
(0.169)
0.002
(0.089)
-0.272*
(0.127)
-0.183
(0.104)
1.012
(0.672)
0.047
(0.075)
-0.023
(0.047)
0.017
(0.062)
0.057
(0.031)
1.872***
(0.214)
0.413
(0.238)
1.639***
(0.276)
1.231***
(0.247)

-0.184
(0.195)
0.173
(0.306)
0.211
(0.135)
-0.043
(0.075)
-0.102
(0.087)
0.082
(0.093)
-1.283*
(0.639)
0.112
(0.096)
0.007
(0.022)
-0.079
(0.042)
0.001
(0.014)
0.174
(0.161)
0.022
(0.129)
-0.121
(0.387)
0.137
(0.165)
-43.265***
(9.486)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.884***
(0.039)
-5.197**
(1.896)
0.022***
(0.002)
5.629*
(2.467)
-0.067***
(0.016)
0.963
(0.569)
Controlled
3.742***
(0.829)

Inflation
(Host)
GDP (Host)
GDP Per Capita
(Host)
Exchange Rate
Natural Resource
Openness to FDI
Political Risk
IMR
Year, Industry, and Province effects
Constant

Journal of International Business Studies

-0.764
(0.628)
Controlled
-0.876
(1.249)

0.328
(0.765)
Controlled
0.593
(1.157)
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Table 4 (Continued)

Wald Chi2
N

Model 8
(All OFDIs
sample)

Model 9
(All OFDIs
sample)

Model 10
(OFDIs targeting
developed)

Model 11
(OFDIs targeting
developed)

367.86***
1,668

7187.49***
1,223

209.27***
1,271

3462.48***
892

Note: p \ .1; * p \ .05; ** p \ .01; *** p \ .001. Standardized errors are in parentheses. Due to space limitations, we omit the coefficient estimates of
the year- and industry-dummy variables in this table. To receive the observable coefficients, we apply the unit of GDP (Host) at billion, Inflation at
thousand, and the units of GDP Per Capita, Exchange Rate, and Openness to FDI at ten thousand.

Variables such as GDP level, exchange rate, natural
resource, openness to FDI, and political risk
(Models 9 and 11). It seems that the home country’s institutional fragility at this selection mode is
less important than in the previous scan mode.
In addition, the coefficients of the Inverse Mills
Ratio is significant in Model 9 and weakly significant in Model 11. It suggests that the first step of
the OFDI decision (whether to go global) affects the
second step of the OFDI decision in terms of
location under a decision tree. We discuss the
implications of this result in the next section.

DISCUSSION
Contributions
Our study makes three important contributions to
the field of IB and strategy. The number of OFDIs
from emerging economies has significantly
increased from $2.8 billion in 1980 to $454.1
billion in 2013 (UNCTAD, 2014). As a result, the
rationale for why these firms engage in OFDI
demands more attention from scholars (Child &
Rodrigues, 2005; Child & Marinova, 2014). Our
study sheds new light on this stream of research.
Some recent studies have begun to focus on the
home-country institution context as a driver or
barrier for OFDI (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Child &
Marinova, 2014). Along this line, two different
views emerge. Some scholars have argued that
home country institutions can provide strong support for firms during their OFDI activities by
providing a variety of incentives (Hitt, Ahlstrom,
Dacin, Levitas, & Svobodina, 2004). For example,
Luo, Xue, and Han (2010: 74) point out that
Chinese Ministry of Finance (MOF) established
developing funds for small and medium-sized
enterprises to encourage the competition of international markets. In contrast, the institutional
escapism view suggests that firms from emerging
economies are pushed abroad due to inefficient

domestic institutional environments that include
rampant corruption, regulative discrimination, and
governmental interference, among others problems
(Witt & Lewin, 2007; Yamakawa et al., 2008).
By developing an institutional fragility perspective, we do not imply that existing theories are
incapable of explaining the OFDI behaviors of firms
from emerging economies. Rather, our goal is to
enrich and integrate the seemingly contradictory
views on the role of the home-country institutional
context in facilitating or inhibiting OFDI. In our
view, studies that stress the supporting role of
institutions tend to view such support in a segregated way. For example, the abovementioned
financial support from MOF is usually implemented
separately from other important institutional
arrangements such as providing an effective legal
system that protects the interest of firms engaging
in OFDI. Therefore institutional support, while
useful for OFDI, is typically limited in scope and
scale (Chen, 2006; Luo et al., 2010; Saxenian, 2005;
Yamakawa et al., 2008).
Our findings seem to be consistent with the
institution escapism lens (Witt & Lewin, 2007).
While this lens is derived from the context of
developed economies, we are able to extend it to
emerging economies. As we pointed out, developed
economies are characterized by a higher level of
societal coordination: firms escape their institutional environment because the old institutional
regime generates strong inertia and rigidity that
make the institutional adjustment response to
changes in the extra-institutional environment
extremely slow (Schoppa, 2006). This does not seem
to be the case in emerging economies (CuervoCazurra, 2016; Yamakawa et al., 2008). Our theoretical construct, institutional fragility, captures the
enabling nature of institutions in these economies.
For example, in India’s marketization, according
to Cassidy (2014: 56), ‘‘more free-market reforms
and more effective government interventions to
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improve the education system, build infrastructure,
promote social inclusion, and strengthen the rule
of law. One set of reforms without the other is unlikely
to work’’ (italics added by the authors). Similarly,
Mexico puts a huge amount of effort in pushing
reforms, which liberalizes the energy industry for
foreign investors and encourages small businesses
to integrate into the formal economy. However,
regulatory uncertainty, higher taxes, and denser
accounting rules make the costs of reforms materialize faster than the benefits of reforms (The
Economist, 2014b). The key issue is not how the old
institutional regime generates inflexibility, but
rather how different institutional dimensions progress at different paces, creating institutional
fragility across different regions.
The abovementioned concept has been further
corroborated by our interviews. As one of the
Chinese interviewees pointed out: ‘‘In addition to
avoiding the complexity of red tapes and reducing
transaction costs, the main reasons for us to invest
in a foreign market are the friction and conflicts
generated by inconsistencies in policy change. For
example, the provincial government policies have
changed constantly. New policies (due to the
change of provincial leadership) are usually in
conflict with the old ones. This is not something
we can easily handle and deal with by learning from
our peers. The costs associated with this friction are
usually very high, particularly to private firms like
ours. If this type of friction occurs in the economic
downturn, it poses a threat to our survival to some
extent. Investing in a foreign country will certainly
help us reduce this type of risk.’’ Similarly, a Chinese
politician criticizes China’s economic model as
‘‘unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and ultimately unsustainable’’ (The Economist, 2016).
While Boisot and Child (1999) and Child and
Rodrigues (2011) name China as exhibiting external complexity in the business environment, we
would further point out that such inefficiencies
result largely from an incongruent development of
different institutional dimensions rather than a
lack of institutional development. In our regression
model, we control for the variable Marketization
Index, which indicates the progression of marketbased reforms (as the first order of institutional
development). In baseline Model 1, its coefficient is
significantly positive. However, after adding Institutional Fragility in Models 2–7 (as the second
order of institutional development), the coefficient
for Marketization Index becomes less positive. Following the critical realist approach of Miller and

Journal of International Business Studies

Tsang (2011), we separate the effects of Marketization Index and Institutional Fragility, and find that
Institutional Fragility is still positively associated
with an ODFI decision, which further enhances the
validity of our main explanatory variable. In other
words, institutional void (which is represented by
Marketization Index) represents a different construct and is different from institutional fragility.
To this end, our study also contributes to the
institution-based view (Peng, 2003; Peng et al.,
2008). Our institutional fragility approach provides
a more nuanced view of institutional landscape in
emerging economies. It resonates with the emerging view that institutional differences are more
salient at the subnational level in emerging economies (Chan, Makino, & Isobe, 2010; Ma, Tong, &
Fitza, 2013; Monaghan, Gunnigle, & Lavelle, 2014;
Peng et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2014a). In addition, our
institutional fragility approach adds value to the
emerging dynamic view of institutions (Banalieva
et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2010; Marquis & Raynard,
2015), which incorporates both the scope and
speed aspects of institutional reform in emerging
economies. The conceptualization of our core
construct recognizes the fact that institutional
reform in emerging economies should be viewed
as a dynamic (Kim et al., 2010) and interconnected
(Jackson & Deeg, 2008) process rather than as static
and discrete event (Banalieva et al., 2015). Theoretically, both the scope (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau,
2009; Peng et al., 2008) and speed (Banalieva et al.,
2015) of reform are critical in understanding the
dynamic view of institutional change. Research
focusing on the scope of reform emphasizes the
degree of market reforms; hence, dimensions of
institutional reform are treated as an interconnected collective. Multiple subcomponents of market reform are viewed as one static representation
of overall reform level. On the other hand, studies
that examine the speed of reform recognize that
institutional reform is a dynamic process that
evolves over time. The speed of reform captures
the time it takes for a certain reform to take place.
Our construct of institutional fragility pays close
attention to both the scope and speed of institutional reform by clearly presenting situations in
which different institutional dimensions do not
progress at the same rate. This misalignment causes
firms to struggle during institutional reforms,
which associates to internal friction and clashes
that trigger strategic responses.
Finally, our study contributes to the institutional
escapism lens by enhancing it with boundary
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conditions. Firms may not respond in the same way
when they face the same institutionally fragile
environment. Firms’ strategic adaption to institutional fragility largely depends on the nature of
ownership, their productivity, and exporting intensity. We extend existing theories on institutional
escapism by showing how underlying organizational and institutional differences can moderate
the ability to escape from local institutional
environments.

Implication for Future Research
Our study is not without limitations. First,
although our dataset is very comprehensive and
covers firms whose annual sales are over 5 million
RMB, which represents 95% of Chinese industrial
production quantity, the database does exclude
new ventures that do not generate sales. This
omission has some consequences. As Yamakawa
et al. (2008: 71) have argued, ‘‘Many new ventures
may be pushed abroad, because domestically they
are discriminated against.’’ This seems to indicate
that new ventures are more subject to institutional
fragility. In other words, future studies that incorporate new ventures can further strengthen our
main argument.
Second, firms may have multiple responses to
institutional fragility. In the face of increased
institutional fragility, a firm could downscale or
down-scope in addition to escape. To test this
possibility, we collected new data on sales growth
and new product development at the firm level.
Our analysis indicates that institutional fragility
significantly reduces a firm’s sales growth as well as
new product development,7 which suggests that
firms can downscale or down-scope when they face
institutional fragility. However, theoretically, these
options are not mutually exclusive with the option
of outward FDI. Since the major goal of our study is
to understand how institutional fragility impacts
firms’ internationalization decisions, exploring
other possible responses demonstrates an interesting venue for future research. For example, future
research could explore how the two main mechanisms of institutional fragility—relational complexity and cognitive complexity—affect firms’ other
strategic choices.
Third, results from post hoc test III are very
interesting and merit further discussion. Theoretically, firms’ foreign direct investment decision is
sequential (Aharoni et al., 2011; Liang et al., 2105;
Peng, 2012). Empirically, we further collect destination data and treat governance distance as a

dependent variable for the second step decision in
post hoc test. Our results in Table 4 suggest that the
higher the fragility of institutional environment,
the more likely the focal firms in that region will
escape to a country with longer governance distance when targeting developed economies, during
the second step of region scan mode of the decision
tree. It indicates that institutional fragility may act
as a distinctive theoretical mechanism during different parts of the sequential decision process. In
the first step of OFDI decision-making (whether to
engage in OFDI), firms in regions with higher
institutional fragility aim to escape their respective
regions in an attempt to reduce both cognitive and
relational complexity. In the second step of OFDI
decision-making, firms in these regions (where
institutional fragility is high) are more likely to
invest in a country with better governance policy
(such as the rule of law) than those of their home
country. This finding complements the springboard perspective developed by Luo & Tung
(2007). They argue that emerging market MNEs
use OFDI as a springboard to alleviate home
country institutional constraints. Our institutional
fragility approach further enriches their argument
by developing a more nuanced view of such
institutional constraints. A learning and symbiotic
approach could help managers build synergy
between headquarters and subsidiaries when they
invest in countries with long governance distances
(Sun, 2009; Liu & Woywode, 2013; Gaffney et al.,
2016). Future studies that adopt a qualitative
approach can significantly improve our understanding on this interesting phenomenon.
Fourth, institutional fragility is not only a determinant of outward FDI, but might also potentially
be a block to inward FDI. We find that the
correlation between inward FDI and institutional
fragility is -0.153, suggesting that institutional
fragility is a block to inward FDI. In addition, after
collecting regional data and regressing institutional
fragility on inward FDI, we find that institutional
fragility significantly associates with fewer new
inward FDI in the focal region.8 This further
strengthens the underlying association between
institutional fragility and outward FDI as inward
FDI will suffer a similar constraint due to both
relational and cognitive complexity.
In fact, early conventional views regard inward
FDI as a substitute for international trade, therefore, factors related to sales and profit maximization such as production costs and infrastructure
adequacy are the main determinants of inward FDI
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flows (Balasubramanyam, Salisu, & Sapsford, 1996).
Some other studies apply the economic geography
theory (Krugman, 1991) to test the importance of
agglomeration in inward FDI distribution within
large emerging economies (Cheng & Kwan, 2000;
Chang & Park, 2005). However, prior studies in this
line of research only view institutions as a single
entity, such as corruption, rules of law, and
government regulations (Campos & Kinoshita,
2003; Wei, 2000; Sun, Yang, & Li, 2014). Future
studies that focus on the multidimensional nature
of institutional environment (e.g., institutional
fragility) would be particularly rewarding.
Fifth, China’s institutional differences on the
provincial level provide an invaluable opportunity
for examining the link between within-country
institutional fragility and an OFDI decision. Therefore, our findings are generalizable to other emerging economies with distinctive subnational
disparities such as Brazil, India, and Russia. Future
studies exploring within-country institutional differences in these emerging economies would also
be extremely worthwhile. It is also interesting to
note that the role of the state in China has a strong
influence on firms’ OFDIs. Although this is clearly
distinctive compared with developed economies, it
may be interesting to compare the role of the state
among different emerging economies. India, Brazil,
and Russia are all experiencing similar capital
escape due to domestic institutional change/fragility. India’s OFDI amount has increased from $4.3
billion in 2003 to $21.1 billion in 2008, but
dropped back down to $1.7 billion in 2013, as a
result of government-induced restrictions to prevent capital flight. Similarly, Brazil’s OFDI amount
peaked at an impressive $28.2 billion in 2006, but
has decreased drastically in recent years due to
severe government interventions. Further research
on the role of the state in these emerging
economies would be very rewarding. Similarly,
although institutional fragility prevails in emerging
markets, variant qualities of institutional systems
or misalignment of market mechanisms can exist in
any type of market (Khanna & Palepu, 2000), which
in turn requires specific strategic adaption (Peng

et al., 2008; Witt & Lewin, 2007). Therefore the
applicability of this notion is in essence not limited
to emerging markets.
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NOTES
1

We drop records in CIED before 2000 because no
information exists on OFDI transactions by industrial
firms prior to 2000.
2
In one case (Beijing 2009) where the change in
reform sub-index equals zero, we add a minute value
of 0.001 to take the natural log. This is a standard
approach used in the economics literature (Acemoglu,
Moscona, & Robinson, 2016; Xie, 2013).
3
This variable is used to maintain data continuity.
We have tested other variables—e.g., total assets and
revenue—and the results are consistent.
4
These results are available upon request.
5
These results are available upon request.
6
Based on World Bank member economics in the
2009 edition, we classify a country with a gross
national income (GNI) per capita higher than $11,456
as a developed economy.
7
These results are available upon request.
8
These results are available upon request.
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